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INTRODUCTION 
The weakness and the eventual destruction of the Weimar 
Republic were the result, to some degree, of the Treaty of 
Versailles and the Weimar Constitution.  To a far greater 
degree the failure of the German Republic was the result of 
the incongruity of the democratic republic superimposed on 
the inherent authoritarianism of the German people. 
The Revolution of 19l8, a revolution decreed from above 
and imposed upon the people, was nothing unique in the history 
of Germany.  The German people as a nation have not taken 
advantage of their revolutionary situations, partly because 
they have been so thoroughly indoctrinated in the principles 
of state service and duty to the state, and partly because 
the liberal tradition in Germany has always been an under- 
current.  The two examples of tradition liberalism that 
modern Germany rests most heavily upon are the 'War of Libera- 
tion and the Revolution of 1848. 
These examples demonstrate the weakness of the liberal 
elements in Germany.  The War of Liberation was a nationalist 
war fostered and supported by the Prussian government to free 
Germany from foreign oppression; the relatively liberal reforms 
were given by the government, not demanded by the people.  It 
did much for Prussian nationalism, but little to inculcate a 
liberal tradition.  The revolution of 1848 was suppressed 
because the aims of liberalism were not enthusiastically 
accepted by the people.  Thus the weakness of the German 
liberalism invariably lies in the inability of the liberal 
elements to capture the imagination of the German people. 
The liberal elements in the Weimar Republic (primarily the 
Socialists) suffered the same fate; the conservative, even 
the reactionary,  elements held  the mass of  the population. 
The  isolation of the  liberal forces  in the Republican 
Germany meant  that the Socialists had  to ally themselves with 
the reactionary and  the conservative  forces.     It  is one  of 
the  greatest misfortunes of  the period  that  the new Republic 
was  forced to depend upon the Reichswehr for support. 
The Reichswehr was one  of  the   strongholds of reactionary 
nationalism in Germany.     The  officers and the men were  anti- 
democratic and  anti-republican;   they were,   on the whole, 
monarchists and  they were  strongly  imbued with Junker attitudes 
and  traditions.     The nationalistic  annexationist desires of 
the Reichswehr made  the  government  suspect abroad,  and   their 
suspicious alignment made  the Leftist elements within Germany 
wary. 
This does not mean,   however,   that  the  German Socialists 
were not nationalist also.     They proved  their patriotism and 
their nationalism in policies  that lay  strangely with their 
socialist theory.    The Socialists had associated   themselves 
directly with the war in 1914- by voting the war credits;   their 
instructions  to  the  German delegates at  the Paris Peace Con- 
ference  resounded with nationalism;   their refusal  to accept 
the eastern frontiers and their entreaties concerning German 
minorities within the eastern states were also prompted  by 
nationalist fervor.     It was one of  the weaknesses of the Weimar 
Republic  that the Socialists*  nationalism so  often triumphed 
over their liberalism. 
The position of  the Socialist parties was another weakness 
of the Republic.     The Majority Socialists and  the Right Inde- 
pendent Socialists  comprised part of  the Centre Republican 
Bloc.1    The alliance of the  Social Democrats with the centre 
parties indicated  the  real desires of  the  German Socialists 
as a whole.     They preferred alliance with the parties immedi- 
ately  to  the right of them rather than with  those  to  their 
left  because  the Socialists were  itfibued with a characteristic 
German trait—they respected  and admired  the   traditional  author- 
ity represented  by the  Centre.     The  Centre Republican Bloc 
was opposed on the  left by  the Communists and  the Left Indepen- 
dents and on the  right  by the Nationalists and  later by the 
Bavarian People's Party and  the National Socialists.     This 
centre  position,   coupled with the dependence  on the Reichswehr, 
lessened  the Social Democrats'   chances  of  obtaining the  support 
of the whole  of  the working classes. 
.although the  centre position was  a disadvantage  to  the 
Social Democratic Party,   in a  sense  it was an advantage  to the 
Republic  because  it did allow the ooalition of the moderate 
Socialists with the other centre  parties.     This coalition 
provided  a workable majority in the Reichstag in the  early 
republican period. 
The opposition of  the Nationalists  to  the republican centre 
had  its  foundation in the  centre's acceptance  of  the  Treaty of 
1 See Appendix, 
Versailles.  It is significant that the Nationalists did nothing 
to prevent the republican elements from accepting the treaty, 
but they used this capitulation of the Republic to the Allies' 
ultimatum as a means to attack the centre. 
Versailles was regarded as an unacceptable treaty by the 
German nation as a whole.  The Social Democrats were just as 
vehement in attacking the treaty as the Nationalists, were 
just as opposed to the territorial terms and to the war guilt 
clause; but they (with the other centre parties) accepted it 
because they realized that refusal would have meant the complete 
annihilation of the Reich.  The Nationalists realized the peril 
implicit in refusing the treaty, but they, with complete unscru- 
pulousness, assailed the centre for putting Germany in such a 
hinilating position. 
The Treaty of Versailles imposed a handicap of some magni- 
tude on the young Republic.  It exposed the republican elements 
to the combined attack of the Nationalists and the Army; and 
with acceptance, it put the Republic in the position of a 
second-rate nation forced to accept unremitting ultimatums. 
The treaty also imposed a burden upon the Republic because 
by the terms Germany was deprived of territory and peoples 
who had been nationals of the Reich since 1871.  The eastern 
frontiers remained a source of contention throughout the repub- 
lican period. 
The Left opposed the Republic because they felt that the 
Social Democrats had betrayed their Socialist principles.  The 
Weimar Constitution had created a republic with only limited 
socialist'measures,  and  the Left wanted  a Socialist  government. 
The Majority Socialists were  able  to accent  the  Republic 
without compromising their  ideals  because they believed   that 
several stages must   be  entered   into before   the realization of 
a  socialist  state. 
If the Treaty of Versailles was a  handicap to the Republic 
in furnishing strong material for opposition,  the 7/eimar Consti- 
tution was a  handicap  because  it gave   the Right  the methods  by 
which it  could  realize  the  destruction of  its opponents.     The 
Constitution's authors  failed  to take  cognizance  of  the  basically 
undemocratic  heritage of the  German people and with it their 
inability,   even their unwillingness,   to  select democratic 
representatives.    Proportional  representation,  popular refer- 
endum,   and plebiscitary election of the president are all 
democratic achievements,   and  are all to  be  commended   as a 
basis for a  republican government;   they do not,  however,   assure 
a democratic  government.     In the  r.'einiar Republic  they proved 
to be lethal   instruments against the Republic  because   the 
people were  so  basically undemocratic. 
A people  reared  on the  heritage of a powerful Germany 
internationally ruled  by a  powerful autocratic regime   are 
not likely  to  support  in any great measure  a government  that 
had accepted a  treaty which deprived  its nation of her inter- 
national prestige;   that had proved   incapable  of defending 
itself from its internal  opponents;   that,   indeed,   had   to depend 
on its internal opponents  to defend  it from external dangers. 
It  is altogether admirable  in the construction  of a  con- 
stitution  to aim at  the highest aspirations of a people,   to 
attempt  the  greatest possible measure  of representative govern- 
ment for a  people;   but  it  is  foolhardy to  fail  to  take  into 
consideration the   inherent  character of the  people.     If  the 
highest  aspirations of a people are  the  strength and power of 
its  country abroad  and a  conservative,  powerful  government at 
home;   if  the greatest popular representation results   in a 
nationalistic,   annexationist  government,   the  democratic elec- 
toral lav/s will  reflect  these aspirations and that representation. 
Such an accurate reflection of  the  internal picture may be 
democratically desirable,   but   in the V/eimar Republic  it meant 
the  eventual downfall of  the  republican elements and  the 
collapse  of  amicable  international  relations. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 
To  those accustomed  to  thinking  in terms  of the  established 
traditions of  the American,   the French,  and Puritan,   and more 
recently,  the Russian revolutions,   the  German Revolution appears 
as no revolution at all.     In a very  real  sense  it was at  best 
a  "negative  revolution",   that  is,   one precipitated not by a 
violent  insurgent new group,   but  rather by the  voluntary, 
albeit  reluctant,   abdication of  the  old  group.     It was,   in 
effect,,   a  revolution decreed  from above;   and never before  had 
there  been one  so mild. 
The  revolution was primarily precipitated  by  the  unhappy 
turn of  the war.    The adverse  situation  in the  field  let  to  the 
demoralization of  the  civilians  at home.     Philip  Scheidemann, 
one of  the leaders of  the  Social Lemocratic Party,   said: 
"Without the  collapse the Revolution would probably not have 
occurred."^    The  revolution enjoyed  the  support of the majority 
of the nation largely because  the military  reverses of the army 
and  the deplorable  condition of  the  civilian population had 
convinced the German nation as a whole  that the war was  lost. 
Germany  in the Fall of 1918 was no longer the united   force  it 
had  been  in 1914.     The people were  weary of war,   and   starvation 
had left  its mark on the  country. 
It  is significant  to  the history of  the  ill-fated republic 
that the  revolution was  brought forth by  "starvation,   despair, 
defeat,   and foreign dictation."2    It  is further significant 
1 Philip Scheidemann,  The making of New Germany.   J.   I. Michell, 
trans.   (New York,  1929),   II,   131. 
2 S.   7/illiam Kalperin,   Germany Tried  Democracy   (New York),   93. 
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that the forces which carried out the revolution were not true 
revolutionary forces.  It is of course true that the Social 
Democratic Party was a Marxist party and as such theorized on 
revolutionary action; however, it is also true, and even more 
to the point, that the Social Democrats had followed a revision- 
ist policy in Germany to the extent that the left wing Socialists 
had split with the party as early as Llarch 1916 to form the 
Independent Social Party. 
The Social Democratic Party was revolutionary politically 
because it aimed at a radical alteration of the established 
government and because it recognized the possibility that force 
might be necessary, even in the event of holding a majority 
in the Reichstag, to gain control of the government.  This 
view, however, was not universally held since there was already, 
to a large degree, a belief in the inevitability of gradual 
revision.  The revisionists held that the working class had 
first to accomplish certain tasks within the frame of the 
existing government. 
The Socialist Party in Germany had not developed in the 
direction anticipated by its founders.  Because of the alliance 
v/ith the trace unions (who concentrated on bettering the con- 
ditions of the workers) the working class was steadily turning 
into a respectable middle class; and the stronger the trade 
unicn elements, the stronger the conservative tendencies of 
the working class and of the Socialist Party.  The majority of 
the Socialist leaders had abandoned pure Socialist theory to 
become Labor leaders with political ambitions. 
The  German Socialists had  abandoned  also  their revolutionary 
opposition  to   the State  in favor of  constitutional  opposition. 
In ^ure Socialist theory relations  between the State and   the 
party were  negative;   in practice,   they were  excellent.     The 
Socialists had  achieved  a  great deal  of  improvement for  the 
working classes within  constitutional  limits.     .71 thin the great 
mass of German workers  there was  a  strong  class feeling;   it was 
not,  however,   revolutionary class  feeling.     The  German workers 
had  become  prosperous  because  of the  benefits  the  party had 
gained and as their prosperity  grew,   their patriotism grew.     The 
working class  as  a whole  did not  consider  itself Vaterlanfl los. 
The left wing Socialists who   split with the Majority 
Socialists did  so  because  they disapproved  of  the Socialist 
support of  the war.     They had  been dissatisfied  since  the 
Social Democrats voted  the  first war credits  in 1914.     In the 
dyas of  crisis  in 1914  the Socialists  sought  to organize   inter- 
national  action,   they threatened  a   strike,   but  in the end did 
vote the war credits.     The  Socialist Party did not dare  vote 
against  the  credits  for the  army,  actually  they did  not  even 
want to vote  against  them.     The  Socialists,   like  every other 
segment of   the German population, were  patriotic;   they were 
Germans first,   then Socialists.     3y voting for the war credits 
the Socialists associated themselves with the war.     The  only 
protest  came  from Karl Liebknecht,  a  left wing Socialist,  who 
left the. House  before  the vote was   taken.     The  left wing 
Socialists preferred  to follow a pacifist policy which was 
more  consistent with Socialist theory.     Valla  they were  genuine 
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pacifists they did not, as a  whole,   advocate revolutionary 
action against  the  Imperial Government as a means  to  defeat 
the government and the v;ar.     The  real  defeatist  elements  among 
the Socialists,   and  thereby the real  revolutionary  elements, 
formed  the Spartacus League.* 
The   leaders of   the Social Democratic Party did   not   even 
desire  a revolution.    They   "had  steadfastly pointed  to  socialism 
as a product of evolution."      For that  reason they were repelled 
by the   idea  of a   socialist  state  enforced  upon the people  by 
revolution alone.     They  joined   the revolution in 1918 to prevent 
the  threat of Communism from becoming a reality.     Fried rich 
2bert,   the   leader of the Social Democrats,   had  favored  a mon- 
archy limited by parliamentary government,   and  only fear of 
Luscovite-ccntrolled Communism induced  him to  join the  revo- 
lution. 
An extremely unstable  coalition between the  Social Demo- 
crats and the Army changed  the  course  of  the  1916 Revolution- 
guiding  it from radical hands  to   those  of more moderate  Social 
Democrats.     The Army had a  twofold purpose  in fostering the 
revolution.     First,   they  believed that a  republican government 
would be able  to  obtain better peace terms from the  Allies than 
the  government of the Kaiser.     Second,   they  thought,  and  planned, 
that when the necessity for a   republican facade  had passed they 
2 R.  T.  Clark,  The Fall  of   the German Republic, (London,!? 35)P.3Q 
4 Albert C.   Grzesinski,   Indlde  Germany,   trans.,  Alexander S. 
Lipschitz,   (New York,  1939),  P.   75. 
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would  be  able  to  discredit and  discard  the Republic  in favor 
of a  government which would  support  their annexation policies.' 
Under these combined auspices Philip Scheidemann proclaimed 
the establishment of the Republic at 2:00 P. V., 9 November 19l8 
from the balcony  of  the Reichstag Building. 
The main supports of  the Republic were  the  Social  Democrats 
and  the trade  unions  because  they alone  could  swing  the  great 
masses of  the  people   to democracy,   and  because  they alone,   among 
the democratic  forces,  had  the necessary administrative  and 
organizational  experience.     Non-working class groups  also moved 
to the   support of  the Republic,   at  least  temporarily,   because 
they fslt  that  it would have  had  the best  ohenoe  of getting an 
acceptable  peace   from the Allies. 
To  forestall  any counter-revolutionary  threat  to the 
Republic,   the Republic would  have  tc  restore   stability  to  the 
nation.     It would  have  to  rebuild  an impoverished  and  exhausted 
country,   and  above  all else,   it would have  to obtain a   just 
and honorable peace  for Germany. 
The  gravest  domestic problem of  the  Republic,  aside  from 
bread  and  demobilization,  was the  choice  between Communism on 
the Russian model   (dictatorship of  the proletariat or  its 
"vanguard")  and  democracy on the western mcdel  (based  on free 
elections).6    About this choice Ebert showed  no hesitation,   no 
indecision,     tie was a Social Democrat,  and  his democratic con- 
victions  could  be  realized  only by the estab]ishment of a 
5 Peter Viereck, Eleta politics   (New York,   194-1),  p.   210 
Arnold Brecht,  Federalism and  Regionalism  in Germany 
(London,   194-5),  p.   5. 
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representative  government.     His  task was  to  secure   a return to 
normalcy  and   to eliminate possibility  of  further revolution. 
To accomplish  these  ends he  pressed  for immediate  elections 
for a  constituent assembly. 
The decisions  for the  calling of  elections for a national 
assembly,   in fact,   the decision for the existence  of a  national 
assembly,   rested  with  the National  Congress of All   ,'orkers'  and 
Soldiers'   Councils which had  been convoked  by  the provisional 
government   (the Council of People's Commissars) for 16 December 
191b. 
In 1?17  the  soldiers'   and workers'  desire  for  :eace and 
their resentment against  the  government found expression in 
the creation of Soldiers'  and   ,,'orkers'  Councils.     These were, 
in effect,   democratic   (although revolutionary)   governing bodies 
opposed  to the  government of  the Kaiser.     In most  instances the 
Soldiers'   Councils were  formed  first and  were later joined  by 
the   .,'orkers'   Councils.    After  the military collapse  the Councils 
assumed  executive   responsibility  in cooperation with the Social 
Democrats   to whom the Soldiers'   Councils promised  support of 
the  armed  forces.     The Councils,   as  the representatives  of 
the  revolutionary elements,  were  called  to authorize  the new 
government. 
The  Congress,   at  this  time  composed mainly of Social Demo- 
crats and  Independent Socialists,   engaged   in heated  debates  over 
the  direction  in which Germany was now  to proceed.     The left 
wing Socialist  leaders,  Dr.  Karl Liebknecht and  Rosa Luxemburg, 
obviously inspired by  the  idea  of a  Socialist  state,  advocated 
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continuing the   revolution.     They were  supported  by  the Independ- 
ent Socialist Party and  by  some  of  the  Soldiers'   delegates. 
Friedrich Ebert was  a leader in the  Social Iiemocratic Party's 
fight  for the National Assembly and  a  democratic  regime.     The 
decision was  finally made   in favor of the democratic  course, 
and general elections were  scheduled  for 19  January  1919.     After 
stating  their opposition to  the decision in the  Congress  the 
Independents  left  the  provisional  government. 
In  connection with Ebert's  evident desire for 8   speedy 
convocation of a  duly elected  constituent assembly it  is   inter- 
esting to  pursue  the  question of his  own authority  in 1918. 
actually his  authority  came  from two  distinct sources:     one, 
revolutionary;   one,   traditional.     He  had  been the  leader of  the 
largest party  in the  last Imperial Reichstag.  Upon the abdication 
of Kaiser William II,   the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Llax von 
3aden,   had   conferred  upon Ebert   (the majority leader of  the 
Reichstag),   the  chancellorship  for the  interregnum perios   (that 
is,  until  a  constituent  assembly   could be elected),   entrusting 
to his  charge  the  executive  functions and the  preparations  for 
the  general elections  to the  constitutional  convention.    This 
action by Prinoe Lax made Ebert  the  quasi-legitimate  successor 
to the  last Imperial  Chancellor,  and   it was   in this  capecity 
that the  civil servants,   the  army   ,   and  the   bourgeoisie  supported 
him.  Almost simultaneously  the mass assembly  of the  representatives 
of the workers and  soldiers appointed him as  the  first  of six 
Commissats  of the People   (that  is,   the Council of People's 
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Commissars,  the provisional government).     Thus he was assured 
also of  the  support of the masses who looked   to  him as a  repre- 
sentative  of  the  revolutionary assembly and as their own delegate.7 
Ebert's  sources  of  authority are  interesting because  they 
illustrate the dual  character of  the Republican period.     In 
one  sense  the Repbulic was  the  culmination of nineteenth  century 
German liberalism,   of the  liberal current from the War of Libera- 
tion and  from 1&48;   in another sense  it was the  continuation of 
the militaristic,   bureaucrntio Reich.     This relationship was 
incongruous  because the  traditional elements   (the  army and  the 
bureaucracy)  were never liberal  in tendency and  their presence 
in the Republic,   in the  face of the fundamentally non-liberal 
nature  of  the  German people  as a whole,  would  almost  inevitably 
leari   to  the  destruction of  the  liberal elements. 
The  Social Democrats were  disappointed  by the  results of 
the general elections   in January  because  they failed   to  get a 
majority   in  the x^'ational Assembly.     The  first parliamentary 
government was  composed of   the  Social Democrats,   the  Centre 
(Catholic)   and  the  Democratic   (middle-class liberal)  Parties. 
From this  time  forth throughout   the Republican period  the 
governments were  coalitions  between the democratic  liberal and 
the mlddle-calss parties.     At times the  coalition was  far more 
rightist,   including the  German People's Party—a party which 
represented  the financial and  great  industrial interests.     The 
Social Democratic Party was not  represented  in the  coalition 
cabinets  at all  times;   their most responsible  action  in the 
7  Brecht,  op.   cit.,  p.   145. 
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government was during the first five and half years of the 
Republic. 
The necessity of forming a coalition government meant that 
the Social Democratic Party would have to forego fulfilling their 
socialist program, the socialization of heavy industry, the 
expropriation of the feudal estates, and a thorough reconstruc- 
tion of the judicial system." The resulting coalition govern- 
ment would not make the tremendous task of the Assembly any 
easier to accomplish.  The new Republic was faced with the 
problem of demobilizing the army and providing relief for the 
people; of creating stability by protecting the government from 
the threat of Communist revolution on the left, and from the 
danger of reactionaries on the right; of carrying out the 
activities necessary if a government is to function.  In addi- 
tion to these domestic problems, the National Assembly had to 
laake peace with the Allied powers and to draft a constitution 
for the Republic.  This staggering agenda would pose difficulties 
even for an assembly with a stable, workable majority; for an 
assembly of such vastly divergent parties the successful achieve- 
ment of such an agenda was almost impossible. 
It was unfortunate that the immediate problem confronting 
the new Republic was the termination of the war and the conclu- 
sion of a peace agreement.  It was even more unfortunate that the 
terms of the *aric Peace Conference were so unacceptable to the 
German people.  The new Democratic regime and the peace treaty 
' Grzesinski, 02. cit., pp. 75-76. 
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were  so tied  together that  the future  of  the Republic was 
dependent to  a l^rge degree  on the verdict  of the  German 
nation concerning the  tern, of the treaty.     Had a more  satis- 
factory peace   been obtained  the   subsequent history  of the 
.eimar Republic might have  been vastly different. 
THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 
The National Assembly  In April 1919 passed  a  resolution 
regarding  the  conclusion of  a  peace preaty with the Allies. 
In essence  it  stated: 
...The German Nation,  which accepted   the  burden of 
severe Armistice  conditions expecting  that peace would 
soon follow,   is  entitled   to a peace  treaty which corres- 
ponds to   the  program of  the President  of  the United 
States  of America which was accepted   irrevocably  by 
all nations as a  basis for the  treaty... .The '.,'ill of 
the whole  German nation refuses to accept a   'peace  of 
might1....The National Assembly expects  of  the govern- 
ment that   it will give assent only to a peace  of under- 
standing and   conciliation  and   that  it will reject a 
treaty which sets at naught the present  and  future of 
the  German people and of mankind.1 
Immediately  following  the passage  of this   resolution the 
National Assembly  created a  special committee—the Committee 
for Peace Negotiations  in the  Constituent National Assembly— 
to handle  all  questions  explicitly dealing with anticipated 
peace negotiations while  the Assembly as a whole proceeded 
with the drafting of a  constitution.     The  committee was  to 
act as  intermediary between the National Assbmely,   the  cabinet, 
and  the various parties.     On 14 April  1914- Konstantin Fehrenbach 
was designated as  chairman of  the  committee and  twenty-eight 
members represented  the  parties.     The  Social Democrats,   as the 
largest party  in the Assembly,  were  represented  by eleven 
delegates.2 
The actual task of preparing the  German material for 
drafting with the Allies  goes  back as  far as  2} December 1917 
1 Alma Luckau,  The  German Delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference   (New York,  194-1),  p.  42. 
2 Ibid.,   p.   42. 
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when Dr.  Karl Helfferich was  asked  to make economic preparations 
for future  treaties with the Allies.     In November 19l8 Count 
Bernstorff,  director of the Paxkonferenz,  was  consigned  the 
responsibility for the preparations  for peace negotiations. 
The Foreign Office  also had a  great wealth of material to be 
used  in preparation for the  treaty neogtiations.     It was gener- 
ally assumed at the   time  all  these memoranda were  being readied 
that Germany would  negotiate   the  terms  of the  final draft with 
the Allies.    ITo one  seriously entertained  the  thought  that  the 
Allies would  "dictate"  the peace. 
In April  1919 the Scheidemann government presented  its 
representatives to the iaris Peace  Conference with a number 
of instructions.     These  instructions emphasized   the point that 
..'ilson's program should  be used as  a basis for the negotiations. 
The territorial  instructions  of  the government  included   the 
demand  for a plebiscite  in Alsace-Lorraine,  the  rejection of 
the separation of  Saar and left Bank of the Rhine  from the 
Reich,   the  insistence  that  .Vest Prussia and Upper Silesia 
not  be  ceded. 
The  economic  terms were  even more  forceful.     The  govern- 
ment  instructed  the  representatives  to  insist that  the Saar 
3asin coal mines  be  left  under the  German control,   that  repara- 
tions  be  based   solely on damages to  civilans and  their property; 
that the  blockade   be  immediately lifted and Germany be allowed 
to regain control  of her merchant fleet and be  unrestircted, 
or at least be  unimpeded,   in her economic  relations with other 
19 
nations.     Furthermore,   the  representatives were   to  reject 
unilateral disarmament  by the Reich.2 
The German government was to be officially represented 
at the Paris Peace Conference by six delegates led by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ulrich Brcckdorff-Rantzau. The 
Social Democrats selected two delegates, Otto Landsberg and 
Robert Leinert. These six delegates and a staff of experts 
arrived  in Versailles  on  29 April  1919  to receive   the  treaty. 
The   chief  difficulty which  confronted  the German delegation 
was that  there  was  to  be  no  oral discussion.     They were obliged 
to make  their objections  to  the  treaty  in the form of  written 
notes and  they were  given only two weeks  in which to prepare 
these notes. 
On 7.May the  German delegates met  and  received  the  con- 
ditions of peace  from the allies.     It was at this meeting  that 
Count 3rockdorff-Rantzau antagonized the allies,   both by his 
attitude   and   by his  speech which  began: 
Gentlemen,  we are  deeply impressed with  the  great mission 
that  brought us here  to  give  to the world   forthwith  a 
lasting peace.     We are  under no  illusions as  to the  extent 
of our defeat  and   the degree  of our powerlessness.     ..'e 
know that the strength of the German army  is broken,     Je 
know the  intensity of the hatred which meets us,   and we 
have   heard  the victor's passionate  demand  that as the 
vanquished we   shall be made  to pay,   and as  the guilty 
we  shall  be punished.4 
The   terms presented  to the  German delegates were  severe: 
^lsace-Lorraine was  to  revert  to France;   the  German territory 
" Kalperin, op_. cit., pp. 137-1J8. 
Luckau, op_. cit., p. 220. 
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west of the Rhine was to be occupied for fifteen years; the 
Left Bank of the Rhine and a strip to the east fifty kilometres 
wide was to be permanently demilitarized; the Saar 3asin was 
to be governed for fif-teen years by a League of Nations Commis- 
sion, with a plebiscite at the end of the period; Upper Silesia 
was to be ceded to Poland along with West Prussia and most of 
i-osen; all German colonies were to be surrendered; and a Gerraan- 
Austrian .t^nchluss was forbidden. 
To prefent the continuance of German military might the 
Allies decreed that the Great German General Staff be dissolved; 
that compulsory military service be abolished and the army be 
radically reduced; that the manufacturing of munitions be dras- 
tically curtailed; and that military aircraft, tanks, and all 
offensive weapons be forbidden. These disarmament terms were 
only what was to be expected from a Europe which had been 
threatened with annihilation by an aggressive Germany.  In 
their efforts to secure the permanent impotence of Germany 
the Allies were, in effect, destroying Germany's chances of 
internal stability by creating an issue on which the army and 
the nationalists could unite against the government.  In 
regard to the disarmament terms Scheele says:  "The Allied 
Statesmen fondly imagined they were destroying German military 
power, whereas in reality they were pruning the tree that 
it might be the stronger."^ 
5 Scheele, Godfrey, The ..elmar Republic (London, 1946), p. 83- 
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The Allied  terms  that  the  army be  limited  to  one  hundred 
thousand  enlisted men for twelve  years  and   an officers  corps 
of four thousand,   serving for twenty-five  years,   enabled  the 
Reichswehr to  create a military elite.     In the pruning process 
(that  is,   the process  of  cutting the  army from a war time  size 
of four hundred   thousand  to the  stipulated  one  hundred   thousand) 
the army rid   itself of  the  conscripts and  reserves,  the  liberal 
elements of  the  old  army.     This made  it possible  for the high 
command  to  carry out  its dual policy—harshness  toward   the 
left,   leniency toward  the  right.     The application of the Allied 
terns  by the  German High Command  had  left the Reichswehr more 
united,  more militaristic,   and more  nationalistic  than it had 
been during the war years. 
Similarly the ban on heavy military equipment was  utilized 
to  the advantage  of  the Reichswehr.     While  the Allies  retained 
the heavy immobile  character of their armies,   the  German army 
devised methods and  equipment  suitable   to a  small mobile army— 
methods which were   realized  in  the 31itzkreig: warfare  of  the 
second   .^orld   ..'or. 
The economic  terms of  the   treaty were   the most strongly 
contested  sanctions of the  treaty.    Not only the magnitude  of 
the reparations,   and  the economic  sanctions  taken against Germany, 
but  the   justification of these  actions  crested   immediate ani- 
mosity  in German public opinion.     Germany was deprived  of almost 
all of  her financial holdings;   her merchant  fleet was reduced 
to less  than one-fourth of  the pre-war size,   and her shipyards 
for five  years were  to  build  ships  for the Allies;   she was 
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almost completely  barred from Allied markets;  and  the Allies 
reserved  the  right  to most-favored-nations  in Germany for 
five  years.     The  renumciation of her colonies was also demanded 
of  the Reich. 
The  German delegates to  the iaris Peace Conference and  the 
German nation as  a whole  felt that  the severity  of  these  terms 
was due  to  the fact  that the Allies  had  inadequate knowledge 
of  the conditions  in Germany and  did  not realize  the  inevitable 
consequences which would  take place   in Germany as a  result of 
the  conditions of  peace. 
The  question of  reparations and  the  responsibilities aroused 
great hostility  to  the  treaty from the government,   from the 
representatives of  the  government at Versailles,   and  from the 
German nation as a whole.     Article  321 of  the Treaty  read as 
fellows: 
The Allied and Associated governments affirm and  Germany 
accepts  the responsibility of  Germany and her Allies for 
causing all  the  loss and damage  to which the Allied  and 
Associated  Governments  and their nationals have  been 
subjected  as a  consequence  of the war  imposed  upon them 
in the aggression of Germany and  her Allies. 
The German losses  became  intolerable  to the  German people 
when they were  represented as punishment for moral  transgres- 
sions.     The nebulous  attitude of  the Allies  in their unwilling- 
ness or inability  to  determine a  definite amount of  reparations 
caused  further German hostility.     The  German government main- 
tained  it would  be   impossible  for them to  sign in good  faith 
Luckau,   op_.   oit..  p.   241. 
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an indefinite commitment for reparations the fulfillment of 
which might be quite impossible. 
Following the presentation of the terms to German dele- 
gates, the first feeling was that acceptance of the treaty was 
impossible.  Scheidemann resigned as head of the cabinet rather 
than accept the treaty, and 2bert considered resigning but 
was persuaded by his friends to remain in office. 
Schiedemann explained his opposition: 
We are one flesh and one blocd, and he who tries to 
separate us cuts with a murderous knife into the live 
flesh of the German people.  To preserve the life of our 
people is our highest duty...I ask you, who can as an 
honest man, I will not say as a German...accept such 
terms?  './hat hand would not wither that binds itself 
and us in their fetters?' 
A section of the Centre Party, under Matthias Erzberger, 
gradually appeared willing to accept a modified treaty--a 
treaty omitting the war guilt clause and the clause demanding 
the war criminals be turned over to the Allies for trial. 
At the same time that the National Assembly was beginning 
to engage in discussions concerning acceptance of the treaty, 
the German delegation at Versailles was trying to wring con- 
cessions from the Allies.  The Allies, cognizant of the discus- 
sions in the National Assembly, made a few minor concessions, 
the only significant one being a provision for a plebiscite 
in Upper Silesia.  This was their final stand.  The German 
government was given five days to answer. 
^ Scheidemann, op., cit. , pp. 310-311. 
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The National Assembly was having difficulty forming a 
government  because   the  Democrats  remained adamant in their 
refusal  to   join any government which would  consider signing 
the  treaty.     Eventually a  compromise was reached;  the Majority 
Socialist Party and.  the Centre Party  formed  a  government,  under 
Gustav Bauer,   and proposed a modified  acceptance of  the  treaty. 
This  qualification included  repudiation of the war guilt  clause. 
The Allies  refused  to budge  from their position and 
issued  an ultimatum,   the  treaty must  be  signed  as  it was. 
The Allies were  demanding the  unconditional  surrender of 
the  German nation;   and  the National Assembly for the  good 
of their people,  mustered a majority vote  for such a  surrender. 
The opposition was made up  of  the Nationalists,   the People's 
Party,  almost all  of   the Democrats,   and  some  of  the   Centre. 
albert Grzesinski  reflects  the  Socialist view in this 
statement: 
The war had   to  be  terminated at all costs  if Germany 
was  to  endure.    The people and  the  army were no more 
able  to  continue  the  struggle....Nevertheless,   certain 
elements demanded  renewed  resistance  in view of  the 
disastrous  peace  terms  inposed upon Germany and the 
failure  to  bring about a modification....These  demands, 
however,  found  only a  thin echo among the war-weary 
masses.* 
There was no  real  desire  for resistance   in 1919.    The 
atmosphere was  one  of disillusion and  positive defeatism.     The 
Germans had   become   resigned  to  territorial loss,   to  a heavy 
& Grzesinski,   o£.   cit.,   p.   56. 
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indemnity,   and  to military occupation by the  enemy for an 
extended period  of  time.9    ErZberger said the  rejection of 
the  treaty would  mean the political  chaos and  economic ruin 
of Germany,   and  the nation had rather accept a  hirr.iliating 
peace  than an annihilating war. 
One of  the worst  aspects of the  signing of the  treaty 
was  the  complete  unscruplousness of  the  anti-republican elements 
in utilizing  the  capitulation of the   republican government as 
propaganda  against the Republic.     It was  only  by  sending a 
public appeal  to  the army  that  the  government  seems  to have 
prevented  the  complete demobilization of  the  army at  this time. 
The  final decision was wired  to Versailles on 23 June 1919, 
only  two hours before   the  ultimatum deadline.     In  it the 
1,'ational assembly explicitly  stated   its objections  to the 
treaty. 
...Yielding to overpowering might, the government of 
the German Republic declares itself ready to accept 
and to sign the peace treaty imposed by the Allied 
and Associated governments.  But in so doing, the 
government of the German Republic in no wise abandons 
its convictions that these conditions of reece represent 
injustice without example.*-° 
The prevalent opinion in Germany about the Treaty of 
Versailles may be gleaned from a paragraph in a letter by 
Dr. ./alter Simons-the director of the legal division of the 
German Foreign Office and a civil service representative of 
the Foreign Office at Versailles—written to his wife, 10 Hay 1919, 
^ Clark, o£. cit., p. 58 
10 Luckau, p_£. cit., p. 482. 
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The  treaty which our enemies have laid   before us   is,   in 
so far as  the French dictated   it,   a monument of patho- 
logical  fear and pathological hatred;   and  in so  far as  the 
the Anglo-Saxons dictated it,   it is the work of a  capi- 
talistic policy of the   cleverest and most brutal kind. 
Its  shamelessness does  not lie  in treading down a  brave 
opronent,   but  in the fact that from the  beginning to 
end all  these  himiliating conditions are made  to  look 
like   a  just  punishment,  while  in truth there  is  in them 
neither  shame,   nor any  respect  for  the  conception of 
justice.11 
In the opinion of lord   D'Abernon,  Ambassador to  Germany 
during  the  early  years of the Republic,   the   treaty had   several 
sericus defects.     It  had  been imposed  upon the Germans,  and 
the German public  opinion did not consider  settlements made 
under duress  binding.     The  insistence  on war-guilt as a  basis 
for German responsibility for reparations was emphatically 
denied   by  the   Germans.    Furthermore,   the  treaty,  which was 
supposed  to unite  the v.orld,   broke  Central Europe   into  a 
12 considerable number of small states. 
The German government issued an appeal to the people on 
June 24, 1919.  In it the government asked the people to abide 
by the treaty and to strive for its fulfillment.  "There is 
only one way out of the darkness of this treaty:  the preser- 
vation of Heich and the people through unity and work."1^ 
"•Ibid., p. 120. 
12 Viscount D»Abernon, The Diary of an Ambassador. (New 
York, 1929), I, m   26-27. 
* Luckau, op_. cit., p. 497. 
THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION 
The German People,   united in all their branches,   and 
inspired by  the determination to  renew and  strengthen 
their Reich in Liberty  and justice,  to preserve  peace 
both at home  and abroad,   and to  foster social progress, 
have  adopted  the  following Constitution.1 
This   is  the Preamble  to the V.'eimar Constitution adopted 
on 31 July  1919 and promulgated 11 August 1919 by the  German 
Republic.     The  phraseology of  the preamble   illustrates  the 
transitory nature of  the Constitution.     It  is  a transition 
between the past,   traditional Prussian absolutism,  and  the 
future, western parliamentarianism.    To  the  end it remained 
a  transitional phenomenon for the  Social Democrats who viewed 
it as  the  first phase  toward a better,   a greater future  for 
the German people.     The Social Democrats realized  that Germany 
was not prepared  for a  Socialist state;   therefore  they con- 
sidered the Republic as  the first stage  in  the evolution to 
2 
a Socialist  state. 
The Constitution,  which v.as being drafted  similtaneously 
with the  convention of  the Paris  Peace  Conference,  was a delib- 
erate   compromise  of  the many conflicting interests  in  the 
National Assembly.     The authors of   theConstitution—foremost 
of whom was Professor Hugo I-reuss,   the Minister of  the  Interior— 
were  influenced  by  the precepts of western democracy,   primarily 
that  of Switzerland, France,   and the United  States;   but  they 
were also  careful  to retain as many of  their German precedents 
1 Scheele,   op_.   cit. ,  p.   42. 
2 Grzesinski,   op,,   cit.,  p.   7S 
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as could be successfully woven into a democratic parliamentary 
structure.  The retention of the term "Reich" was a consciously 
held link with the past; it served as a symbol of German unity, 
a unity which transcended the structural form of government, 
monarchical or republican. 
The ideal of unity was the primary motivating force behind 
irrofessor Preuss's draft of the Constitution.  "The essential 
factor (in the Constitution to him) was the integration of all 
the natural energies in an organic state."* He sought especi- 
ally to unify the Reich and to create confidence in and loyalty 
to deniocracy and parliamentary government. 
The Constitution established a government of carefully 
devised checks and balances based on plebiscitary foundation. 
This elaborately conceived structure was created to ensure the 
prevalence of the nation's will—the sovereign will of the 
German people. 
As a concession to the South Gerxaan States the federative 
principle was retained, but this was abridged by the stipulation 
that the national government ws.s more powerful than that of the 
Lander.  The Reich was empowered with extensive exclusive powers 
of legislation, including such matters as foreign affairs, 
national defence, tariff and monetary policies, and immigration 
and emigration.  The power accorded to the Reich was also 
3 Scheele, o£. cit., p. 12, 
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enhanced by legislative authority concerning many matters which 
it shared concurrently with the Lander.  These concurrent powers 
embraced legislation on civil and criminal law, judicial pro- 
cedures, public health, labor, commerce, banking and industry. 
In addition the Reich could legislate to protect public order 
and safety.  The unequal distribution of legislative authority 
between the Reich and the Lander.was complicated still further 
by Article 13 of the Constitution. 
As long as, and in so far as, the Rgich does not make use 
of the powers of legislation, the Lander shall retain 
the power of legislation.  This does not apply to the 
power of legislation which belongs exclusively to the 
Reich.4 
The State authorities were to enforce the laws passed by 
the Reioh unless The Reich specified otherwise. However, the 
national government had the right to supervise the enforcement 
of all their laws.  This right of supervision is indictive of 
the pronounced trend toward centralization of the administrative 
powers under the Republic.  The dependence of the Reich on the 
individual state governments, with their essentially varying 
views, for the enforcement of national laws was a serious 
shortcoming in the composition of the .Veimar Constitution. 
This danger to the Reich was rendered ineffectual by the sub- 
ordination of the state authorities to the Reich authorities 
through the more extensive legislative powers of the latter 
and by the first provision of Article 48 of the Constitution 
(the Emergency Powers of the Reich President). 
4 Halperin, pjo. oit.. p. 156. 
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If one  of the States fails to perform the duties  that 
fall upon  it  under  the Notional Constitution or under 
National Statutes,  the Reich President with the aid 
of  the armed   forces can hold  such State  to  the prefor- 
mance  of  its duties.5 
The  division of authority created  by the Constitution's 
authors did not   stop with the division of power  between the 
Reich and   the   individual Lander.     It also encompassed  division 
of power within  the fundamental  structure of  the  Reich machinery. 
The Reich President,   the Reichsrat,  and  the Reichstag were 
consciously  endowed with elaborately interrelated  functions. 
The  Reich President was envisaged  by the National Assembly 
as the  symbol of the unity of the Reich.    He would  receive  his 
power directly  from the people,  and  in the  system of checks 
and balanced he would   serve as  a  ccunterblanace  tc  a powerful 
Reichstag.     The Reich President was to be elected for a  term 
of seven years,   and was eligible for  indefinite  re-election. 
The presidential election by popular vote was unsatis- 
factory,   even a dangerous,  provision in the Constitution. 
It gave  the  president a position of  some  independence  from 
the various parties,   and  it enabled him to  entertain policies 
irrespective  of Reichstag confidence  or  support.     The  Social 
Democrats,   realizing the  implicit danger in  a  strong Reich 
President,  wanted  the presidential term limited  to five  years 
and wanted  further to make   it impossible  for any Reich President 
to serve  more   than two  terms.    This stand was defeated on the 
5  Brecht,  Arnold,  Prelude  to Silence,   (New York,  1944),  p.  140, 
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that a powerful  president would  serve as a  stablizing force 
in the  government. 
"The National Assembly wished  to create a  strong president; 
in fact  it  had  given him almost absolute power."       The  Consti- 
tution had  in truth granted  to  the Reich President  extremely 
broad powers  in his  right  to appoint and  dismiss  the Chancellor, 
and  in his  right  to  dismiss  the Reichstag.     The   sole  limitation 
on his  right  to appoint  the Chancellor was the  constitutional 
clause which  stipulated  that the Chancellor must have  the 
confidence  of  the Reichstag;   and  the only limitations placed 
on his  right  to  dismiss  the Reichstag were the   stipulations 
that the Reichstag  could  be  dismissed not more  than once  for 
the   same  cause,   and  that new elections must be  held   immediatley 
after dismissal    of  the Reichstag. 
The most extensive  pov/ers  of the Reich Fresident were 
outlined  in Article  48 of  the Constitution.     It was  the  powers 
included   in this   article which gave  the Reich President the 
dominant  position  in the Reich.     By the powers  granted  inher- 
ently  in  this  article  the Reich President was empowered   to  compel 
the Lander to  enforce the  national statutes,   and  he was  further 
empowered   in the  event of  an emergency to  "take   any measure 
necessary"  to restore  public  order and  safety,   even  to  the 
extent of  suspending the  fundamental rights  guaranteed  by the 
Constitution. 
6 Scheele,   0£.   cit.,   p.  49. 
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The  authors  of Article 48—perhaps lulled  by the  comfor- 
table  respect  for constitutionalism and parliamentarianism 
exhibited   by Friedrich 2bert,  the  first Comii-issar cf  the People— 
maintained  that  any abuse  of the  article would  be  prevented  by 
four checks.     First,   the Reich President  -as elected  by popular 
vote.     Second,   any measure  taken by  the  president  required  the 
ccuntersignature  of   the Chancellor or a  minister concerned  with 
the measure*     Third,   the measure  taken by the president  could 
be  cancelled  by a  simple majority vote   of  the Reichstag.    Fourth, 
the Reichstag  could  regulate further details of any measure  by 
a majority vote.     These  broad emergency powers,  despite  the 
restrictive  clauses   to safeguard  their abuse,   turned  out  to 
be a  fatal measure  in the Constitution.     A strong Reich rresi- 
dent would  be  able  to utilize  the  loopholes in the  restrictive 
clauses  and  carry  forth any measure  he desired  with little  or 
no legal  opposition. ' 
The  Reichsrat was the  representative  body of the Lander 
in the Reich.     It  was also  the weakest organ of national govern- 
it 
ment.    As   the  expression of  the zander the Reichsrat v/as empow- 
ered   to  originate  and review bills  equally with the Reichstag, 
but the Reichstag was dominant in the natter of  enactment of 
laws.    Furthermore,   the veto of  the Reichsrat over the  legis- 
lation of  the Reichstag could  be  overridden by a   two-third 
majority vote  of  the Reichstag,  or by a popular referendum 
initiated  by the Reich President. 
7 Brecht,  Prelude  tc Silence,   p.  141. 
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The  Reichstag represented the country as a whole.     The 
members were   elected for a period  of  four years  by universal 
equal,  direct,   and  secret sufferage  by all men and women over 
twenty years  of age.     The Reichsrag elections were  conducted 
in accordance with the  principle  of pure  proportional represen- 
tation.     The Social ijemocrats were  the principal  exponents of 
proportional  representation which they believed  to  be  the 
system most expressive  of popular opinion. 
It  is apparent that   the principle  of proportional repre- 
sentation makes possible   the most democratic  representation 
of the  views of the people,   but  it presents a grave peril  to 
any government—the peril of   instability.    Proportional repre- 
sentation promotes  the establishment  of a great number of 
parties and the splitting up of  existing ones.    In republican 
Germany  this meant that,  when every group could  find a  party 
to reflect  its particular view,   it was  impossible  for any one 
Party to  carry a workable majority to  the Reichstag.     This 
meant,   in turn,   that  the Reichstag business must be  carried 
on by either unstable majorities  or by a minority  cabinet. 
The lack of  integration of parties ultimately resulted  in an 
unstable  legislative  body dominated  by a  strong executive who 
was not forced  to represent any of the  various views supported 
by the Reichstag parties. 
The weakness of the  Reichstag,   then,   lay  in proportional 
representation,   in the strength of the Reich President,  and 
furthermore,   in the provision for popular referendum to which 
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the Reichstag legislation could  be  submitted  on the   initiative 
of the Reich I resident.® 
The  provisions  for popular referendum embodied   two week- 
nesses for the Reichstag.    First,   a  referendum meant that  the 
people,  not  the Reiohstag,   had  the final decision in legia- 
lation;   and  second,   the people   (partly  because  of  their authori- 
tarian  background)  were not necessarily  concerned with the 
welfare  of  the Republic as a whole.     It  is  futile to expect 
people who  are  basically undemocratic and who have  never had 
any great voice   in  their government  to  be  immedlately able  to 
understand  the  problems of the nation and  to act disinterestedly 
for the  benefit of  the nation. 
Popular referendum on the Reichstag legislation was  included 
in the   constitution because  of the prevalent distrust  in Germany 
of parliamentary government.     The principle  of parliamentary 
government had  been accepted  by  the National Assembly but they 
restrained  it  in the  same  system of  checks and  balances which 
impeded  the whole  machinery of  the Reich. 
The Reichstag could  check the Reich President's  right to 
appoint  Chancellors  through the necessity of Reichstag confidence 
for the  Chancellor.     It the   confidence of the Reichstag was 
formally withdrawn the Chancellor  must resign.     The National 
assembly did not provide ministerial responsibility however, 
therefore  the Reichstag could not  compel  the Reich President  to 
8 Scheele,   op_.   olt..  pp.  48-49. 
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retain a Chancellor as  long as he  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the 
Reichstag.     This  curious omission worked to the  advantage of 
the Reich President and,   coupled  with the  power to dismiss   the 
Reichstag and  employ the emergency powers,   it could  enable him 
tc exist virtually as sole  ruler or dictator in the Reich. 
The makers  of  the Constitution announced  their adherence 
to the  democratic liberal  tradition and,  at the  same  time, 
restrained   the power of government in the  second  part of  the 
Constitution  (articles 109  through lSl),  entitled  the  "Funda- 
mental Rights and Duties of  the German People."    These articles 
granted  to the  German people  the basic  civil liberties  guaranteed 
in the  Constitution of all the  ..estern democracies.    In each 
ease  there was  a  restriction by authority of a national  law 
or even by authority of a presidential decree.     3y the  utili- 
zation of  these  restrictions  to  the guarantees of civil  liberties 
dictatorial powers  could be acquired   by legalistic methods. 
The  doctrine  of the duty of   the  individual  to  the  state 
was also explicitly stated  by the  framers  of  the Constitution. 
This doctrine  is  essentially  in line with Prussian tradition 
in which the  services of the  individual must be places at  the 
disposal of the  community,   for the good of  the  country. 
Prussia,   throughout her history,  has  had   to  subordinate 
the  individual  to the  state.     This process  began under the 
Great Elector in  the  seventeenth eantury and was best exempli- 
fied  by Frederidk the  Great's  self-imposed  title,   "the  first 
servant  of  the state."    The poverty of natural  resourses  in 
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Prussia and the desire to establish a strong centralized state 
gave impetus to the process.  State service was the highest 
duty of every individual and in exchange for duty privileges 
were conferred upon state servants.  In the ./eimar Constitution, 
although the privileges and duties are parallel, it remains. 
The essence of the doctrine of duty is also in line with 
the idea of the German //ill, a heritage taken from Rousseau's 
General .'/ill.  The General 'Jill is a mysterious thing, all 
but inexplicable to non-Germans.  The General ./ill is the 
expression of Yolk; and Yolk implies unity at the expense of 
the conscious, free decision of equal citizens.  The idea of 
yolk is based on the supposition that the community (the whole) 
is more than the individuals (the parts) which comprise it. 
This supposition, in turn, implies that the welfare of the 
community as expressed by the General ./ill is more important 
than the welfare of each individual; therefore each individual 
is obliged to devote his activities to the welfare of the 
community. 
Parallel with the duty of the individual to the state was 
the obligation of the state to the individual.  Every German 
was to be accorded the opportunity to earn a livelihood. 
Furthermore, because of the Centrists and the Uemocrats the 
economic liberty of the individual was explicitly assured. 
The ,/eimar Republic was proclaimed to be the most liber- 
tarian and the most equalitarian of all constitutions. Theo- 
retically it was the most democratic; and it was because of 
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the democratic frame that Otto ..'els, a Social Democret, could 
ssy in defiance of the Enabling Act of 1933:  "The ..eimar 
Constitution is no Socialist Constitution.  However, we stand 
by the principles of a govern.-.ent based on law and Justice, 
of equality of rights, and of social laws, as therein established.9 
The ./eimar Constitution, on paper, was all that. 
9 Brecht, Prelude to Silence, p. 101. 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
The  German. Republic and   the counter-revolution against 
the Republic  began simultaneously.     From the  day of the  proc- 
lamation of  theRepublic  by Philip Scheidemann,   the  republican 
elements   in Germany had   to defend  the Republic and  democracy 
from both the Left and  the Right.     The Communists  on the Left 
and  the   German Nationalists  on the Right,   both wished  to dis- 
card  the  basic  principles of  a democracy.1    The  Communists 
desired  to carry  the  revolution further,   they wanted  a  dicta- 
torship  of  the  proletariat.     In the  eyes of the Left  the Ebert- 
ocheidemann government was a  betrayal of Socialist  principles 
to  bourgeois  bureaucratic  interests.     The Nationalists  wanted 
to destroy democracy with  its principles of parliamentary 
government  by freeing the  executive  from the control of the 
parliament.   It  is doubtful that the Nationalists  in the  early 
years of  the Republic desired  to go  beyond  the  restoration of 
the  constitutional  situation as  it existed   before the war. 
The   streng.      of   the Rightists was drawn from the Freikcrps 
and from reactionary old  army command.     The Frelkorps were 
voluntary fighting units  formed  at  the   same  time  the  regular 
army was being demobilized.     They were  soon to be found  in every 
part of   the   country,    In the  internal  confusion accompanying 
the demobilization of  the  regular army the Frelkoros were used 
as police  units and as  reserve  units  of the  deminished  regular 
1 Brecht,  Prelude  to Silence,  p.   15- 
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army.     The members  of  the Frelpcrps were primarily professional 
soldiers and officers;   they were anti-3olshevist,  anti-Socialist, 
and anti-Democratic.     In their glorification of militarism and 
the old  regime   they  stood in the forefront of the counter- 
revolutionary movement against  the Republic. 
The  Frelkcrps.   in turn,   counted  on the support  of the 
Junkers and the most reactionary of   the  landowners.     It  is 
significant  that  the stronghold  of  the Frelkorps was in South 
Germany which was  intensely  "nationalistic" and which opposed 
to a unitary  state. 
The  Communists were  strongest  In highly industrialized 
areas of  Germany.     Their ranks were filled by the working 
classes,   and they were  undoubtedly encouraged,   if  not  supported, 
by  the Soviet Union.    Albert Grzesinski,  a  Social Democrat, 
said  that  "throughout the whole  period of t lie   German democratic 
republic,   the masters of Russia   spared no agitation,  no money 
or efforts to  conquer Germany for Bolshevism."2    The Communists 
organized  the   "red guards"  during the  confused period  of  the 
early twenties. 
The Nationalists,   the party of the  old  regime,  made  them- 
selves  immediately the  centre of opposition to the Republican 
regime.     Its  representatives felt themselves the representatives 
of the n atlonal cause,  and in so being they hindered the 
government in every way possible.    The Nationalists were the 
2 Grzesinski,  op.,   clt.,  p.   69. 
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most vehement  attackers of the  Communists.     The decried the 
Communists  as harbingers of Bolshevism and they clamored for 
the  complete eradication of   the Bolshevist threat. 
The  fear of Bolshevism was  a genuine  fear in the years 
immediately  following the war. 5    The people were tired of war 
and  they were definitely opposed  to the   idea of continued 
revolution.     The  fears of Bolshevism seemed   justified when the 
first  overt opposition actually did  come  from the Left. 
Early  in January 1919 a Leftist putsch was originated 
against the  Ebert-Scheidemann government.     On the   night of 
5 January 1919 Spartacus  elements occupied  several districts 
of Berlin,   and  the  next day,  amid mass demonstrations,  they 
demanded  the surrender of  the  government.     The  only way the 
government  in Berlin could handle the situation was to call 
for help  from the  troops garrisoned  at lotsdam.     The  garrison 
at I-otsdam was  commanded by reactionary officers who were 
more  than willing to  quell  the Leftist  insurgents.     The 
putsch was thoroughly defeated  by 11 January 1919,  a week before 
the  elections v/ere to be held.     In Larch the  Spartacus  resumed 
their rebellious activity and were  ruthlessly crushed  after 
bloody street fighting. 
The first  of the Rightist  opposition movements,   the Kapp 
tutsch in 1920,   was precipitated by the Allied  demands that 
all  extralegal military formations be abolished.     The Allies 
insisted  that Germany fulfil  the  disarmament terms and disband 
3 Clark,   0£.   cit.,  p.   50 
1 Crzesinski,   op.  cit.,   pp.' 61-62. 
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all of her military organizations;   the Nationalists insisted, 
equally emphatically,  that the military formations were necessary 
to protect  the  nation and maintain  internal security.     Ebert 
and Gustav Noske,  the Minister of   ,/ar,  did not  consider the 
situation too alarming.     They believed  that  the danger lay in 
the radicalism of the left. 
The Ebert-Bauer government tried  to   appease the Allies 
by demanding the dissolution of the Marine Brigade which was 
led by Captain Ehrhart.     The  counter-revoluticnnry  activity 
was being  commanded by General Luettwitz,  an old guard militarist 
reactionary.     The Nationalist Party  and   the People's Party were 
sympathetic   to the  reactionary  counter-revolution but they 
remained  aloof  until   they were  assured  of the success  of the coup. 
On the  night of 12 ^arch 1920  the Maria*  Brigade marched to 
Berlin;   on the morning of 1J> iviarch 1920 they  entered   the  city 
unopoosed—the government   had  fled.     This was Lapp's answer 
to the demand  for the  dissolution of the  brigade.     The  govern- 
ment  had been forced  to flee because they were unable  to  assure 
themselves of the  support of  the Reichswehr.     General von Seeckt 
had refused  to fire  on  the Rightist rebels,  an action which made 
it impossible  to defend Berlin.     The Reichswehr, as a unit, 
never took an active interest  in opposing the Republic.     In 
the Kapp Putsch some scattered  formations sided with  the rebels, 
ethers remained neutral.^    The  rebels occupied  the  government 
buildings,  and Lapp proclaimed  himself Chancellor,    lie tried 
"  Grzesinski,   o£.   clt.,  p.   88. 
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to enlist  Seeckt  in the  putsch but the general refused.     The 
rebels,  among them Ludenocrff,   then issued  an ultimatum demanding 
the  resignation of Bauer and all the  Social  democratic ministers. 
The  Social  Democrats,   supported  by the Independents,   the 
Democrats,   and the  Centre,   called for  a general strike.     The 
labor unions  responded  overwhelmingly to the  appeal,  and  the 
strike was  fully  effective.     The   economic life   of the country 
came  to virtually a  halt.     The  result of the general strike 
was the  collapse  of  the Kapp Putsch." 
The Lapp Putsch had several  diverse  results.    It  revealed 
the weakness  of the  counter-revolution because  the  expected 
support,   the upper middle   class and the high bureaucracy,   cid 
not materialize.     The middle  class and   the  high bureaucracy 
did not support  the ^app Putsch because they were   not confident 
of his success.     Ead  he succeeded  they would have been willing 
to acknowledge him,   but they were too  cautious  to reveal  th«ir 
sentiments  openly.    As  long as the government yielded  to the 
desires of the conservatives,   es  it was doin? at the  time,   the 
upper middle   class  and the  bureaucracy would remain loyal   to  it. 
The  putsch  revealed also the weakness  of   the government 
which  could  not maintain sufficient military support to be able 
to  defend  itself.     The  government  could not defend  itself  against 
the Right because  the Reichswehr,   the only force  the government 
had  for defense,  was  so  conservative,   so EightlW,   in character 
6 ibid.,  p.   101;   cf.  Halperin,  op.   cit.,  p.  182. 
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that it could  net be cabled  upon in the   event  of an attack by 
the Right.     If  the   government had  insisted upon Socialist workers 
being taken into the   array instead  of the old  guard nationalists 
it would probably have been capable of much stronger action 
during the Kapp Putsch.    A more  tangible  result was  the  ensuing 
period of  intense  civil war.     In the Ruhr the ontipKapp  strike 
fell into  control of the radical  left.     The disturbance there 
was finally quelled  by the Reichswehr in April 1920. 
Following  the Kapp Putsch a more conservative frame  of 
Kino  prevailed   through out the  country.     The Reichswehr's action 
against the workers led  to renewed  aotivity by the Freikorps 
and other nationalist military  organizations against the left. 
There were  constant  clashes   in ±-omerania and   ..esthpalia,   and 
in Bavaria  the Social Democrats put an end to their participa- 
tion in  the Bavarian cabinets.7    In  this period also were  the 
first prominent terorizing  attacks by  the Right.  In 1921 
Matthias Srzberger was killed;  and  in the same year the Storm 
Troopers  of the Ilatl- nal Socialists German Workers Party were 
formed.    On 24 June  1922 Rathenau was assissinated.    The 
greater part of the  nation was shocked  by these criminal acts. 
The immediate  reaction of  the working classes to  the  assassina- 
tion of Rathenau was the adoption of a more militant attitude 
toward the  right. 
Leanwhile,   Communist  activity and  agitation was also 
apparent  in the  Reich.     In  the Spring of 1921  there was a 
7 Halperin,  op_.  cit.,   p.   185. 
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Communist uprising  in Central Germany,   openly supported  by the 
Communist Party.     This uprising lasted  until the  end.  of April. 
In October 1923  the  Communists planned  nnother uprising,   but 
called  it off before  it actually began.     The  reactionary activity 
awakened all the  groups left of the center  to  their imperiled 
position.     In July  1922  the Independent Socialists and the 
..lajority Socialists  agreed   formally  to   cooperate. 
The occupation of the Rhur in 1923 proved  to be  a godsend 
tc  the Nationalists.  In the  strange manner of politicians  they 
vented   their violence  on  the Republic.     Gustav Stresemann,  who 
formed his  cabinet  in August 1923,  was  especially  suspect  to 
the Right  because of the  foreign policy  of  fulfilment and  his 
desires  to  compromise with the Allies.     The Nationalists 
violently objected   to withdrawing the policy of  passive  resis- 
tance  in the Rhur. 
The  occupation of the Rhur gave occassion for the hitler- 
Lundendorff lutsch,  November 1923.     The lutsch was  originally 
intended as  a putsch of the State of Bavaria,  against  the Reich. 
The elements   comprising  the  putsch were  quite divergent, 
including recalcitrant Bavarian officials,   the Reichswehr 
sectioned  in 3avaria,   and the National Socialists united  only 
by  their hatred  of the  Republio. 
The  government  group was afraid that Hitler's National 
Socialist  forces would  act prematurely  in staging  the   putsch. 
When   the  Reich proclaimed martial law,   outlawing the  Communist 
Party and all Nationalist military  organizations,   the  government 
group wavered and   them disassociated  itself from the hitler 
movement. 
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Hitler was still  confident of the support of Lunich.    He 
and Lundendorff  led  the march through Munich on 9 November 1923 
(the anniversary of the proclamation of the  Republic).    The 
.;azi march met v.ith the armed resistance  by the Reichswehr and 
detachments of police.  At tils time Lord  J'Aberncn reported: 
Things  looked very much like  the  beginning of civil 
war;   for some  time past there have been c-.uthexitic 
rumors  both of  sympathy with hitler in Pomerania and 
East Prussia,  and  of the  concentration of considerable 
selbstschutz  bodies  in the forests  :;orth and east of 
Berlin.     Unless the Hitler-Ludendorff  rutsoh is  sup- 
pressed  at once  it looks  like the gertainty  of  severe 
fighting  in many  parts of Germany. 
Immediately after the Hitler lutsch the  Social Democrats 
took more aggressive  stand  against the Right-.    They demanded 
that action be taken against   the  reactionary elements who were 
trying  to destroy  the  unity of the Reich. 
In Saxony in 1923  a  semi-Communist government had been 
created.     This government was  deposed  by a Reich Commissar 
equipped with extraordinary powers.     In the Rhineland  separatist 
movements were  being formented and  supported  by the French and 
Belgian troops  stationed there. 
The action taken by  the Reichswehe and  by the Reich  itself 
were much more severe   to the  laments  on the  left  than to those 
on the   right.     There was in truth a  "dual  standard of  justice" 
meted out after the  outbursts  in 1923,   and it was  because  of 
this  that the   Social Democrats left  the   "Greet Coalition," 
causing  a  necessity for the formation of a new government. 
8 D'Abernon,   o£.   cit.,  II,  p.   287. 
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Action within the Reichstag itself reflected   the  increasing 
conservative  trend  of the  country.     As early as February  1922 
Sbert had mentioned the necessity of  fixing the d-ite of  the 
first popular election of the  Reich President.     The Nationalists 
insisted  upon an  immediate  election,   but the Democrats  and the 
People's Party agreed that a presidential  election held  at this 
time  would  .lunge   the  nation into greater confusion.     The  Social 
Democrats,   burdened  by their constitutional scruples,   supported 
Ebert's plea for an election.     The  Centre  solved  the  dilemma 
by recommending that Libert's term of  office  be  extended   to 
June  1925.9 
In the May 1924 elections  impoverished middle   class  elements 
flouked  to the  Rightist parties.     The roost  spectacular gains 
were made  by the Nationalists,  whose parliamentary  representation 
rose   to ninety-six members  in the  Reichstag.     Coupled with 
alliances with several  small Rightist parties,   this gain made 
the Nationalists the largest party  in the  Reichstag.    The working 
classes moved  progressively  to  the   radical Left;  therefore  the 
Social Democrats lost to the advantage  of  the   Communists.  This 
boded   ill  for the   democratic-republican elements because the 
Communists  had  reached the  stage  of political maturity where 
they could  vote  consistently with the Right to  defeat the 
republican centre.     The  Democrats,   the People's Party,  and 
the  Centre Party also  lost  parliamentary  seats. 
9 Kalperin,   o£.   cit.,   p.   240. 
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The elections  in December 1924 had a vastly different 
outcome,   evidence  of the improved  economic picture   since the 
last elections.     The  Dawes Flan had  been accepted by the  Reich- 
stag in August 1924.    After signing the London protocol Germany 
was permitted   to  float a loan.     The   success  of   the  loan and 
the creation of the  Reichsmark as a  substitute for the discre- 
dited Rentenmark  strengthened the economic  situation in Germany. 
This stability could  not recover the lost savings of  the 
bourgeoisie,   but  it  did  halt the   inflation which had been 
detrimental to the working classes.     The  situation was beginning 
to approach normalcy  and  the  people were beginning to be  optimistic. 
Since   the working classes and the lower middle  class were 
much better off  than they had been in »..ay,  the Communists and 
the national Socialists—the  extreme  parties—lost appreciable 
representation in  the Reichstag.     The  Social  Democrats were  the 
principal  beneficiaries  of the change  in  the   internal economic 
situation;   they increased  both  their pro ortlcnal   representa- 
tion and   their Reichstag membership.     The Nationalists also 
drew an  increase   in Reichstag seats  so they  remained  a  force 
to be  reckoned with. 
Ebert died   27 February  1925;  a  heavy blow to the Republic. 
Gustav Stresemarm,   in an article  in the  «i,eit,   said: 
The  death of the  first President of the Reich creates a 
void   in reaard  to which no one   can  today tell how it is 
to be  filled.     In tills  I am not  thinking primarily  of the 
office of President.     The  late President never concealed 
the   ffcot   that he did not pro ose  again to  offer himself 
for election,   so that his activity as President of the 
Reich would  have  come  to  a  constitutional end June   30th. 
•   „ 
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But even  though Friedrich ^bert had  resigned  from his 
of:ice,   he  remained  one of the  very few strong and big 
personalities  in Germany who  were  in a   - osition and were,n 
qualified   to take  part  in gre°t  decisions of  the  future. 
The  various political parties  occupied  themeselves   in tyring 
to  line  up  presidential  candidates.     Otto Braun,   the Premier 
cf Prussia,   was the  Social Democratic  candidate;  Karl Jarres, 
the mayor of Duisburg, was the  candidate of the Nationalists 
and the People's Party;   '..'ilhelm Llarx was  the Centre candidate. 
The  Communists,   the Bavarian People's Party,   and  the National 
Socialists also selected  candidates for the Geman  elections. 
The  elections  on 25 May 1925  resulted  in Jarres polling 
the largert vote,   but  since  he failed  to  obtain a  majority 
cf the votes there had  to be a  second election. 
For  the  second   election the Social Democrats,  the Centre, 
and  the  Democrats  formed  the People's Bloc and  sup orted i..arx 
as their candidate.    Field Marshall van Hindenburg was presented 
as the  candidate of the xeople's Party,   the Nationalist Party, 
the National Socialist Party,   and  the  Bavarian People's Party. 
The People's Party entered  this  coalition over the  violent 
objection of 3tresema--n who was dubious of the   reaction of  the 
Allies  to   the   candidacy of hindenburg.11    The Communists again 
presented  Thaelman as   their candidate. 
10 Gustav Stresemann,  Kis Diaries.  Letters,   and Papers, 
ed.  and  trans,   Eric Sutton,   (New York,   1957),  II,   P.   3b. 
11 Ibid.,   pp.   46-48. 
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The  second  election was 2 6 April 1925,   and  its  result wes 
an overwhelming victory for Kindenburg.     The Nationalists were 
so overjoyed  by the results of the election that   they  became 
practically  reconciled  to  the Republic.     The  conservatism of 
the  nation and   the  Eiech was  amply demonstrated  by the  elec- 
tion of Hindenburg;   and  the victory of the Right  foreshadowed 
the decreasing  influence of  the Social  Democrats  in the Republic. 
REPARATIONS AND THE DAWES PLAN 
The Reparation Clause  of the Treaty of Versailles  included 
1. German liability to consist of payment for 
all damage done Allied civilian population 
and  their property   (Art,   232). 
2. 3y  1 may 1921  the  Reparation Coma.ittee: 
a. to notify Germany of the  total  amount of 
this liability; 
b. to present Germany with  a schedule  of 
payments for discharging this li^.bi:' ity 
within thirty  yeers  (Art,   233). 
3. The  Reparation COiULittee  to have power to 
modify this schedule,   but  not  to  cancel 
any of  the liability  (Art.   234). 
4. Germany to pay  (in gold  and conimoditied) 
before  1 Lay 1921,  the  equivalent of twenty 
millards  of  gold marks   (art.   235)• 
A joint meeting of Allied and  German Reparations experts 
assembled  in Brussels in December 1920 to consider objectively 
the capacity of the Reich to make  reparations payments.     The 
German experts  supplied  the Allied  experts with  facts and 
figures of the  financial and economic position of Germany at 
the   time,     From tins  study of the German economic conditions 
the Allied experts prepared a  list of recommendations to be 
placed  before the Supreme Council in Paris for  use by  a new 
Reparations Commission.     The German government insisted  that 
v.ithout  balancing their budget and stabilising their exchange 
any promise made   by  them would  be worthless.    Reparations 
could  _x>t be guaranteed  by an insolvent  government. 
The Paris Conference   (January 24-30,   1921)  was approached 
immediately  by the French delegation which proposed  an extra- 
ordinary  schedule  cf payment to be made by Germany.     This 
1 u'Abernon,   o£.   cit.,   I,  p.  42. 
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schedule  was   rejected  by  the Conference as was the list  of 
recommendations  of the experts.     England   counseled a   policy 
of moderation,   and  finally  after a  great deal of discussion 
the Paris  Conference presented  the following terms: 
1. Forty-two  annuities,   running from 1 Lay 1921 of: 
a. 2 milliard geld marks for 2 years 
b. 3        ■ »        •• M    3 "   it 
c. 4 H n H "3 " 
d! 3 « " " " 3 » 
e. 6        " "        " " 31      " 
Equals  226 milliard  gold marks,  plus 12  per cent 
on German exports. 
2. Annuities  to be discounted: 
8 psr  cent  until  1 Lay 1923, 
6 per cent  from 1 Lay 1923 to  1 Lay 1925, 
5 per cent  from 1 Lay 1925. 
3..     No  State  credit  operation outside  German territory 
without  consent of Reparation Commission. 
4.       Reparation Commission to hold watching brief over 
German customs,  v/ith  ..ower to admi.iister?if Germany 
defaults In her  reparations  obligations. 
The Paris decision was  considered quite  unacceptable 
in Germany;  German public  opinion was  strongly against  it. 
At the first London Conference   (21 February-14 Larch 1921) 
the Germans  submitted  their counterproposals  to the ~'arls 
Conference.     The Germans  had agreed   to most of the  terms 
individually;   the  chief difficulty remaining was  to   reach 
agreement  fixing the  total  indebtedness  of  Germany.     The 
nature  of   the  counterproposals aroused  bitterness  and  resent- 
ment on the part  of the Allies  because  German acceptance   of 
the laris  terms was made  contingent upon the  removal of restric- 
tions  upon Germany's  commercial  relations,   relief  from further 
payments or deliveries under the  terms of the Versailles  Treaty, 
i 
2   Ibid.,   p.   144. 
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renunciation of the Allies right  of  jurisdiction over German 
property  abroad,  and the  solution  of the question of Upper 
Silesia.     The London Conference  rejected the German  counter- 
proposals. 
A second  London Conference met  from JO Maroh to  5 Hay 1921. 
During this Conference  the   total  indebtedness  of Germany was 
fixed  at  132  milliard gold marks.     Germany was   informed  that 
her refusal  to comply would  entail  the  occupation of  the Ruhr 
as the primary  sanction.     The  terms  of  the schedule of payments 
and an ultimatum  (giving Germany six days  in which to reply) 
were   sent   to  3erlin,   6 Lay 1921. 
The  German government considered  this amount more  than 
the Reich would  be able  to pay.    A new government was formed, 
with Josef   ,/irth as  Chancellor,   composed  of the Social Demo- 
crats,   the  Centre,  and the  Democrats.     '.;ith the  vote  of the 
Independents  the  government  obtained a  majority  in the Reich- 
stag and   accepted  the  conditions of the  ultimatum. 
Wirth and  Rathenau inaugurated their policy of  fulfilment, 
supported by the Reichstag.     There was  a twofold purpose under- 
lying this policy.     First,  they  thought that by attempting 
to carry  out their obligations  they would prove  their  inability 
to attain  complete  fulfilment.  Second,   they wanted  to defeat 
the pessimism of the  German people  by restoring confidence, 
In themselves and   in the  Reich. 
A crippling blow to the German economy occurred  in  the 
Plebiscite  in Upper Silesia .     A majority of the  popular vote 
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was cast  in favor of Germany;   counting the vote  by communes, 
the results favored Poland.     The Allied decree  regarding the 
plebiscite was to divide  the  province.    Poland  received  less 
than half  of the  province,  but the  half she received  contained 
almost all of the  mines,  mills, and furnaces   in the province. 
This meant   that   the  German fulfilment policy was even more 
difficult  to achieve.     The   cabinet  resigned  as  a  result,and 
,'firth was again  faced  with the  problem of creating a govern- 
ment.     In  the  new cabinet,  Rathenau was  appointed  the Foreign 
Linisted.     This appointment  brought  forth vehement protests 
frcm the Nationalists. 
Late  in 1921 the German  government  had declared  its 
inability  to meet  the  next payment  on reparations because 
of financial difficulties and  had asked for a moratorium 
for the  next year.     The Reich stressed that  in order to 
meet  its obligations  it must be allowed  to make foreign 
loans.     In march 1922 a  partial moratorium was granted to 
Germany. 
The  inflation in Germany made her task of  fulfilment 
almost  impossible.     The Germans consistently used  the  infla- 
tion as the excuse for their  inability  fee  make  reparations 
payments.     Actually,   however,   there   is all too little  evidence 
that  the  German  government did  anything to stop  the,infla- 
tionary  spiral.     Certainly  it never made the  obvious connection 
5 Halperin   ,  ID.   cit.,   pp.   203-204. 
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between  the constantly decreasing value  cf the nark and the 
ever-increasing amount  of  currency  in circulation,   currency 
which  the government printed.     The   government's  failure to 
halt the  inflation n^ay have been due  in part  to  the  close 
alignment between the government and the  industrialists 
(who were profiting from the inflation);  or its failure may 
have been due  to  its unwillingness to pay any  reparations. 
In December 1921 the Reich was  forced  to ask  the  Repara- 
tions Committee  for an  extension of  time  on the  reparations 
in kind   (timber)   that was due.     The Reparations  Committee, 
over the strenuous  objection of the British member,  declared 
that Germany had defaulted  on the terms  of  the  treaty.     In 
January 1923,  the Reparations Committee, again over  the 
objection of the 3ritish member declared  Germany  in default 
on her coal deliveries;   then France and  3elgium moved   troops 
into  the Ruhr.     Both the United states and  England  disapproved 
of this action. 
The German government declared  the  invasion of the  Ruhr 
illegal.     The government adopted a  policy of  "passive resistance" 
in the Ruhr since active  resistance was  out  of the question. 
The Social Democrats pressed for understanding with the  V.'est 
as a preliminary to  obtaining the  evacuation of the  Ruhr by 
the Franco-Belgian troops,   but  since France  refused  to  nego- 
tiate as  long as the passive resistance  as a  prerequisite  to 
the reexamination of Germany's capacity  to  pay,  the  Cuno 
cabinet had to   resign. 
Ibid.,  p.   251 
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Stresemann  then formed a   cabinet,   the   cabinet of the  Great 
Coalition,   composed  of the Social Democrats,  the Centre,   the 
Democrats,  and the  People's Party.     In order to negotiate with 
the Allies the government abandoned passive  resistance   in the 
Ruhr on 24 September 192}.     Stresei.ann justified  the abandonment 
to the Reich by saying that ""a prolongation of  the  passive 
resistance would not have been possible without  the  complete 
collapse of German currency and industry;  and that no  external 
advantages were to  be  expected  from its continuance.■" 
Following this  action by the Reich an international  com- 
mittee of experts was appointed to  investigate Germany's 
capacity  to pay the  reparations and  to make  recommendations 
to  the Allies. 
The American Secretary of State Hughes,  as early as 
December 1922,  made the  suggestion  that German reparations 
be  clearly  and definitely  separated from politics and  settled 
on the basis of Germany's  capacity  to pay.     In 1923 the British 
Prime minister supported  this proposal.       Stresemann was  steadily 
gaining sympathy for Germany  in England,   Italy,  and the United 
States,   and the  adoption of the  Dawes Plan by Germany was 
Stresemann's greatest success as Foreign Minister—his greatest 
success because  all his  further policies hinged  on it. 
France was adamant  in her insistence upon the  exact ful- 
filment of  the terms of  the  Treaty of Versailles.    She 
'   I 
1 
* Stresemann,   op.,   pit. .   I,  p.   131. 
6 Scheele,   o£.   cit.,  p.   239. 
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maintained  it was the only way  tc   insure the protection of 
France  from future  aggression by Germany,     Stresemann,   however, 
based his   reparations proposals on  the  thesis that in an 
ordered Germany lay   the  strongest  security  for France.     That 
England and  the United States were not wholly  in accord with 
the French position on reparations can be  illustrated by a 
paragraph from a letter by Ramsey LacDonald,   the British Prime 
Minister*    L-acDonald wrote Poincaire  in an effort to  reach a 
reparations  settlement. 
...Thus  it  is that  our people  look with anxiety on 
what  seems to  then France's determination to destroy 
Germany and  obtain predominance  on the Continent 
without  consideration for our reasonable interests, 
and for the future  consequences of  such action on 
the  settlement of European affairs.' 
The  committee of  independent  economic  experts,  under  the 
leadership of the American General  Dawes,  was to   recommend   a 
plan for reparations.    The report   recommended   "the  restoration 
ft of  full economic and fiscal sovereignty to Germany."0    The 
restoration of German unity was  recognized as  a prerequisite 
for reparations.     The plan adopted accomplished Stresemann's 
desires—the evacuation cf the Ruhr and the   restoration of 
the economic and  administrative  unity of the Reich. 
The Dawes Plan based on the principle  of foreign backing 
in Germany  to  enable  her to   restore economic  stability, and 
thus to  enhance  her capacity to pay.    Under the agreement 
. '" 
Stresemann, op., cit., I, p. 310 
8 Halperin, o£. cit., p. 28?. 
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German currency was to  be stabilized  under the   control of a 
central bank v i.ich was also  to receive  the  reparations  payments. 
The bank was to   be   controlled by a   board  composed  of German and 
foreign members.     The stability of the new currency  and the  repa- 
rations  In kind for the first twelve months were  to  be financed 
by au international  loan.     This loan was  secured  by a nortgage 
on German industry  and  railroads,   and also  by customs and 
excise duties,     Parker Gilbert,  an American banker, was  to 
preside  over the whole structure  as the Agent General for 
Q 
Reparations   in Berlin.7 
Preparations for the reparations settlement  took place 
at an Inter-Allied Conference   in London   (16 August  to 21 August), 
The  conference met to discuss  the measures necessary to  put the 
Dawes Plan  into   effect.    Prime Llinister LacDonald was concilatory 
toward Germany,   and  the United States insisted   that  no agreement 
would  be acceptable  which did not command  the  wholehearted 
approval of  Germany.     On 1 August 1924  the Allies extended an 
invitation  to  the Gejuman government  to participate  in the 
conference. 
The  Germans had previously accepted the Dawes Plan as a 
basis for a  reparations  settlement.     It remained  only for the 
Reichstag to  confirm the Pact  of London and  vote the aecessary 
legislation to put the  Sawes Plan into effect.     The  Chancellor 
put the report before  the Reichstag on 27 August 1924. 
9 Scheele,   op_.   cit.,   p.   240. 
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The  confirmation of  the loot  of Londond  required  only a 
simple majority vote,  but the  legislation necessary for the 
enactment of the Plan required  a two-thirds majority.     It 
was  this  necessary two-third majority which posed  a  difficulty 
for the   government.     The  government was  assured  of the  support 
of the Social Democrats,   (who proved  they were  better patriots 
than partisans),   the Centre,  the  Democrats  and  the People's 
i-arty.     The Nationalists,   backed  by the  extremists  of Right 
and Left,  were  emphatic  in  their renunciation of the agreement. 
They considered  it a  "Second Versailles." 
The Reichstag reached an imoasse,  and 2bert threatened  to 
dissolve  it if no progress  could be made.     The Nationalists 
finally  broke  the  impasse  by yielding  to  the virtual bribes 
of the People's rarty and the government.     The People's Party 
said  that  once the  bills were enacted the Nationalists would 
have the  right to  be  represented  in the  cabinet  in proportion 
to  their  strength  in the Reichstag. 
The government  implied  its willingness  to  declare  formally 
that acceptance  did  not alter the Reich's  opinion of  the war 
guilt clause.     T~is  indicated  the urgency  the  government  felt 
toward  the   acceptance  of the  agreement since   it  appears that 
the Nationalists'   position did  not command much public support. 
Lord D'Abernon was even of the  opinion that  the public would 
prefer the  government not  to  carry out the promise  to   the 
Nationalists.     The  public  left,   in his opinion,   that it would 
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be "better (to) break an internal promise than (to) create an 
external crisis and imperil the smooth execution of the Fact 
of London. .•10 
Legislation was passed by the  necessary two-thirds majority 
and the tact of London was  confirmed  29 August 1924,   after the 
Nationalist Party freed  its members  to vote  independently.    After 
the action  of  the Reichstag concerning the London Agreeuent, 
Chancellor Marx  issued  a   statement which began: 
The Reichstag,   by  the  decision taken  today,  has set  its 
seal to the agreements reached   in London.    These measures 
that will  be  of supreme  importance  for  the destiny of the 
German people for years ahead.     The  Government of the Reich 
desires  to express their  thanks  to  all members of  the Reich- 
stag who have  contributed  to this result.    All who partici- 
pated  had   to  overcome  serious misgivings,  and even to  set 
aside   their personal   conviction,   in order that the London 
agreements might be accepted.     Difficult as the  decision 
may have  been in each  individual  case,   it had  to  be  takta., 
if  our Fatherland was to  find the  way to  a better future. 
The  Dawes Plan was accepted  by the German government,   not 
as  an acknowledgment  of guilt; but  as  submission to force.     It 
was essential to Germany and  to Europe  because without stability, 
economically and   financially,   in Germany  it would be  impossible 
to  fulfill  her reparations  commitments,   and  the reparations were 
essential to European economy.     If the Dawes 1-lan was to France 
"morality sacrificed  to expediency,"   it was to Germany the  first 
time  she  reappeared  as an equal in the post-war world.  '      On 
30 August 1924 the London Agreements were   signed  in London by 
the Allies and the German ^uabassador. 
10D'Abernon,   0£.   cit.,  III,  P»   95. 
Stressemann, 0£. cit., I, p. 40o. 
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Scheele, ££. cit., p. 239. 
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If the Pact  of London signified Germany's economic  re- 
emergence as an equal,  Locarno  signified  her political  re-emer- 
gence.     The  Treaty  of Locarno marked  the   termination of a 
definite  era  in international  relations,   it also marked   the 
beginning of  a new era  in German politics.       The achivevment 
of German equality in  iternational relations  had   been the  pri- 
mary interest of  Germany since the  cessation of the war.     The 
Deweg-Locarno  settlements  were  victories  over the Treaty of 
Versailles,   virtual nullifications of the  "peace of  shame." 
The German government had  long recognized that  in order 
for Germany  to enjoy amicable  relations with France  the   nagging 
issue  of  security had  to  be  settled to the  satisfaction of   the 
French.     In 1922  Dr.   Cuno,   the Chancellor of the   "Experts Cabinet," 
had attempted to   establish on agreement with France.    The  basis 
of  these negotiations had been a  non-aggression agreement 
undertaken  by France and  Germany;   England,  Italy, and Belgium 
entering into the  engagement  in a   secondary degree,   and the 
United  States  entering as a trustee.     This proposal was accorded 
a  favorable  reception in Washington but was refused  by the French 
2 
government,   under Poincare. 
Again in 15-23  Germany attempted  to reach an agreement, 
and  in February 1924 Stresemann said  "...To meet a nightmare 
1 Clark o£.  £i£«,  P«   120' 
2 D'Abernon,   gg.  cit.,   III,  pp.   127-129- 
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of  a German attack  on France,   we are  ready to  Offer her an 
international guarantee of  security.■* 
The adoption  of the  Dawes Plan in August 1924 heightened 
the German hopes of  obtaining an international agreement concerning 
the Rhine   because   it set a precedent for mutual negotiations 
between Germany  and the Allies.     This desire  todlspel the  fears 
of France was motivated by the realization that  the  evacuation 
of the  Rhineland,   which Germany desired above all else,  would 
be accomplished  only  after successful negotiations with the 
French. 
In January  1925  Germany initiated  a policy which she  hoped 
would  lead to a Franco-German  settlement.     In a note  to  Great 
Britian Germany prepared  a Pact of Mutual Security which could 
be  combined  with an arbitration treaty.     Furthermore,  Germany 
was willing to sign a  treaty explicitly guaranteeing  both the 
present territorial  status on the Rhine and the  fulfilment of 
the terms  of the  Treaty of Versailles  concerning demilitarization 
a- 4 
of  the Rhineland. 
The reply  of the  British Foreign Office  to   the  note was 
extremely noncommittal.     Sir Austen Chamberlain,  the  Foreign 
minister,   answered  that any pact which had as  its prerequisite 
the evacuation of   the  Rhineland would be unacceptable to  Great 
Britain, and that  the Geneva protocol would have to be disposed 
3stresemann,   op.,   git.,   I,  p.  4-0. 
4D'Abernon,   o£.   cit.,   III,  P«  12$- 
62 
of first.    Undeterred  by  the British attitude  Streseaatin,  in 
the next month,   began negotiations with the French.     The  note 
sent the French was,   in essence,   the same  one which had  received 
such scant attention in London.     The attitude   of  the French 
was sontradictory.     The proposal maintaining the  status £uo 
in the '.Vest,  they viewed with favor,   but tie omission of any 
provisions guaranteeing the eastern frontiers  dimmed their 
approval since they wanted  to protect  their eastern allies, 
meanwhile,   in I.Iorch,  London changed  its policy after rejecting 
the  German protocol and  gave  its provisional   support to 
Stresemann's proposal.     The  English government acknowledged 
its duty to establish France's secutiry,  and stated England's 
particular  interest  in Germany's western frontiers. 
The French reply  to Stresemann's note  came  in June: 
"France and  her allies were  prepared  for an exchange of views 
with Germany regarding the firm establishment  of peace.     But 
Germany must first  become  a member  of   the  League  of Nations 
without making  special conditions." 
This reply to  Germany was not  entirely satisfactory  since 
Germany was opposed  to Article  16 of the Covenatn of the League 
of Nations.     This Article  stated: 
Should  any member  of the League of Nations resort  to war 
in disregard of  its  covenants under articles 12,   15,   or 
15     it shall  ipso facto be  deemed  to have  committed an 
act of war agaiH£t-aTl~other Members  of the League,  which 
5 Stresemann,   op_.   cit.,  II,  PP«  76-77. 
6 Ibid.,   II,  p.   88. 
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thereby  undertakes immediately to  subject it to the 
severance  of all trade  or financial relations,  the 
prohibition of all  intercourse  between  their nationals 
and the  nationals  of the  covenant-breaking State, and 
the  prevention of all financial,   commercial or personal 
intercourse  between nations of  the nations of  the  cove- 
nant-breaking  State  and the  nationals of any other State, 
whether a  member of the League  or not.....' 
In  the  German answer to the Trench memorandum the  German 
government explained  its  reservations  to Article   16.     Germany's 
geographic  position and  her military and economic  situation 
would necessitate  some  special arrangement until Germany's 
position equaled that of   the  other League members. 
The French government was not pleased with  this  answer, 
but  in September 1925  the Allies  invited  Germany  to a  conference, 
This  invitation seemed  to   be  the   answer to  Stresemann's  query: 
"The decisive  question,  the  centre-point  of our relations with 
the Allies,   is whether the Security question  is to be  solved 
among the Allied Western lowers Alone,  or with the participa- 
8 
tion of  Germany?" 
On October 1925  Statesmen from England,  France,  Germany, 
3elgium,   Italy, Poland,   Czechoslovakia,  met  in Locarno and, 
in open,   equal discussions negotiated  the  Treaty of  Locarno. 
England,  France,  Germany,  Belgium,  and  Italy concluded  a  treaty 
which provided the  iiaintenance of the  frontiers  fixed  by the 
Treaty  of Versailles  between France and Germany and between 
7 D'Abernon,  op.,  oit.,   HI,  P«   292. 
Stresemann,   op_.   oil.,   H,   p.   S3. 
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Belgium and  Germany, and  the observance of the  Treaty terms 
relating  to the demilitarized  zone;  non-aggression pacts  between 
France and  Germany and  between Belgium and  Germany;   settlement 
by peaceful means of all disputes  between .France and  Gernany, 
and  Belgium and  Germany;  guarantee  of  these terms by England 
and Italy. 
In addition to  this general  treaty,   Germany signed arbi- 
tration conventions with Belgium and France  and  arbitrations 
treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia.' 
The final protocol of the Locarno agreements was signed 
16 October 1925.     In  that protocol is a  paragraph which reveals 
the  hopeful attitude of  the participating governments. 
The  representatives of the governments  represented 
have declared   their firm conviction that the entry 
into  force  of these  treaties and  conventions will 
contribute  greatly  to  bring about a moral relaxation 
of the  tension between nations,   that   it will help 
powerfully towards the  solution of any political 
and economic problems  in accordance  with the  interests 
and  sentiments of the  peoples,  and  that   in strengthening 
peace  and  security  in Eurppe,   it will hasten on effec- 
tively the disarmament provided   for in Article  8  in 
the  Covenant of the League of nations. 
The Lacarno agreements were not  the  loss   to Germany,  nor 
the  betrayal of German interests,   that many  Germans  seemed to 
think.     It  is  only natural that a   people as  highly "honor" 
conscious as the Germans  should  consider the treaty concessions 
degrading  to the Reich,   but,  as a  matter  of  fact,   Stresemann 
9 D'Abernon,   o£.   cit.,   III,  pp.   280-285. 
10Ibid.,  Ill,  P.   281. 
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had obtained  by diplomatic means,  a  victory Of  some  importance 
for the  German nation.     The concessions  made by  Germany were 
actually confirm:tion of the  previous deprivations.    Alsace- 
Lorraine was lost  to the Reich at Versailles,  not Locarno; 
the non-aggression pacts were essential  to the nation which 
had been disarmed  by the   "dictated Peace"  in 1919. 
3y the terms of Locarno  Germany had  insured  herself  of 
security from the  one  nation who  could possible   injure her, 
France;  and she  had made  oertain that her territory would 
be indivisible,   that there v/ould not be another  invasion of 
the Ruhr.     Germany was now in a position to concentrate on 
her domestic problems,   and  in view of her initiative  in 
securing peace   for Europe   (by means 0f the negotiations 
resulting  in the Locarno agreements)   she  could  anticipate 
the foreign financial aid which was necessary for her domestic 
recovery.     In addition,   and very important to the  Germans, 
Stresemann had  achieved  a distant gain in prestige for Germany 
and a   corresponding loss  in prestige for France. 
Reichstag discussions on the Looarno treaty and the entry 
of Germany  into the League lasted from 23 November until  28 
November.     The  Social Democrats accepted  the Locarno Treaty 
as the fulfilment of  their own foreign policy demands.     The 
Nationalists  rejected it because: 
In the result of the Locarno negotiations the  German 
National  Group  in the  Reichstag cannot  see  the  fulfil- 
ment 3  the demands that will satisfy the vital needs  of  the 
German people.    Moreover, the Group fails to observe the 
66 
conditions  for  the   conclusion of a  treaty,  nor any  contri- 
butions  from the other Towers  concerned  equivalent to  the 
sacrificies   olaimed  from Germany.     In  the  face of this 
result the Group hereby declares  that it will aaree  to 
no  treaty  that does not  satisfy Germany's  vital'needs, 
and more,   especially does not exclude  a  reunuciotion of 
German soil  and   population. 
The Reichstag ratified  the Treaty of Locarno on 2 7 November; 
en 2c  November the law regarding the  entry of Germany  into  the 
League  of nations was passed.     The L'ationalists'   last hopes 
were defeated when frecident von hindenburg signed  the  law. 
The formal  signing of the tre-ity  took place   in London 1  December 
1925. 
The  Treaty of Locarno was a milestone  in the German Republic, 
Before .Locarno,  Germany was a vanquished  enemy and a potential 
threat which must be held in subjection tc  insure the peace  and 
security  of Europe;   she was  a  "Carthage after the second Punio 
War"       in the   eyes of the Allies.    After Locarno agreements 
Germany was again a member in good  standing  in the  community 
of nations;   on her initiative  the peace and security of   -.astern 
Europe  had been pledged ana  guaranteed.     Germany had exchanged 
the  "dictated" peace  of Versailles  for the voluntary,   negotiated 
peace  of Locarno. 
11 Stresemann,  op.,   cit.,  II,   p.   193« 
12 Ibid.,   II,   p.   231. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Weimar Republic was an experiruent in democarcy.     Endowed 
with a  theoretically perfect democratic  constitution   (the  result 
of  & combination of German genius for technical perfection and 
the liberal  ideology of  the  Socialist parties),   it established 
a government more deomcratically  conceived than any in Europe. 
Unfortunately,  however,  the Republic   could not build  on a  fresh 
l'cundatlon;   it had  to build  its democratic  structure  on a   tra- 
ditionally authoritaran base. 
The  base on which the Republic was  to stand was  the  chief 
handicap  of  the new government.     It was too strong a  foundation 
to become  fused with the republican supports which reached down 
to   it;   and the democratic structure was too  fragile to  bury it. 
The German peo;le had become  docile   through centuries of 
government from above.     They  were   thoroughly  inbued with the 
necessity of   discipline and  duty  to the state.     Initiative had 
been replaced  by obedience,   and  individualism had  been replaced 
by  the  General  //ill.     Liberalism had  never been accepted  by the 
major forces;   it had  been accepted only by ineffectual  intellec- 
tuals  isolt-.ted  from the masses of the  population. 
As  a result  the  theoretical  strength of the Constitution 
became  the primary weakness of the  Republic.     The German people 
were not  ready for democratic government.     They had had no 
experience  in self-government and  the  change was  too  swift, 
too  complete. 
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The  Social  Democrats were  quite  correct in their assumption 
that the  German people would not accept a   socialist government, 
that they  could not be capable  of maintaining it.     Their assump- 
tion was  false only in the  limitations,  the German people were 
also not ready for a democratic  government,and  the  Social Demo- 
crats were  no more ready for,   or capable of,   complete  self- 
government  than the rest of the  German people. 
In 1916  the  German people  as a  whole  had not desired a 
republic;   they had  certainly not desired  a revolution,  mild 
though it  was;  all they actively wanted was peace and stability. 
In view of  these desires  the  Socialists drew large support 
from the people at the  establishment  of   the Republic. 
Support of the Social Democrats—and   the  other Centre 
Parties—decreased wben the people  realized  that  the  government 
could not maintain order or even defend   itself.     Their lack 
cf democratic  experience  was reveled when they moved   their 
support  to  the  extreme parties—increasingly to  the  extreme 
of the  Right.     They d id  this because  of the strength of the 
Right  and  because  the  tradition of   the  Right was  something 
they  understood. 
The  German people  had  a great deal of respect  for  strength; 
they liked  and wanted  a  strong government and  a  strong state. 
They desired  equally  the   restoration to  Germany  of  German 
minorities  in the  newly  created  e  stern  states,   and with that 
the restoration of  the  German  prestige. 
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The Social Democrats were  inept politically.     The  revitali- 
zation of  the Reichswehr in its pre-war image was  a preilous 
mistake  for them to have made.    It gave their opponents a 
powerful weapon and  it destroyed   the  internal prestige  of   the 
Socialists.     The  acceptance of  the   treaty was unavoidable,  but 
the government  did  not have adequate  relations withthe  people 
and  so   they  failed  to convince  the  people of the necessity of 
the acceptance.     The  people did know that the  republican 
elements had accepted the   treaty  and that  the Nationalists had 
opposed acceptance. 
As the republican elements gradually lost control of  the 
Republic,  the Republic  gradually changed its character.     It 
became,  not an exjeriment  in democracy,  but a   prelude  tc   a 
strong,   authoritarian government.     The  experiment failed  because 
the only elements  capable of  carrying  it through,  the  Socialists, 
had  surrendered their liberalism to their nationalist;   and 
because the  German people,  whose  cooperation and   support v.ere 
necessary  to make  the  experiment live,   had  responded   to  tradi- 
tional  authoritarian nationalist rather than to  the liberal 
nationalism of the  Socialists. 
APPENDIX 
la the pre-war years  and  during the  years  of the  Republic 
the liberals  in Germany were the Sooialist  elements.     The  Social 
Democratic Party was   the  largest  party in Germany  just  before 
and during the war and during the  early years of  the Republic. 
The party encompassed a  large  segment of the working  classes 
and some of the  middle class  elements.     The  party was Marxist 
in theory but  since the repeal of the  anti-socialist laws  it 
had been following a policy of  constitutional  opposition  to 
the government of the Reich.     The  Social  Democratic Party had 
become  closely aligned with  the trade unions and   in practice 
they were enhancing the position of the workers through consti- 
tutional  methods.   The  Sooial Democrats  still professed  to  believe 
in revolutionary  action but they followed a   policy of gradual 
revision through  the established government. 
In 1916  the  left wing Sooial Democrats broke  away from 
the  party and  formed the Independent  Socialist Party.     The 
Indepentents were more  radical  than" the Social Democrats 
(that  is,  the majority Democrats)   but they were still German 
patriots  until  the end  of  the war.     The  Independents were  led 
by Dr. Karl Liebknecht and  Rosa Luxemburg,   among the most  liberal 
thinkers  in Germany.     The party drew its strength from dis- 
satisfied workers and from intellectuals. 
Both the Socialist parties were compelled to hold the 
working classes from Communism. The German Communist Party 
grew out of the  Spartacus League and was directly connected 
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with Russian Communism.     In  the 19l£ revolution the  Spartacus 
League  tried  to  gain control of the masses  but the  Socialists 
(the majority Socialists)   and  the   army defeated their attempts. 
From that   time on the  Communists attempted  to further the 
revolution.     Their most noticeable  success was in 1923 when they 
gained  a number of Reichstag seats in the  Spring elections and 
when a Lsftist government  sponsored  by the  Communist Party 
was established   in Saxony.     The   same  year in the Fall and 
Winter most of their advances were lost,   both in the elections 
and  in Saxony. 
The  Socialist parties would  have been able   to maintain a 
clear majority cabinet  in  the Reichstag—a Leftist cabinet—if 
they had  been able to work amicably together and  if they had 
been able  to work with' the  Communists.    Unfortunately they 
could  not  and  so the   coalition cabinets  were composed of  the 
Social Democrats,   the   right wing of  the   Independents,  and the 
parties of the centre. 
The  centre  parties  in  the  Reich represented the middle 
class,   the   Catholic population,   the   lesser  industrial and 
financial  interests.     3ecause  of   the system of proportional 
representation there were  several  centre  parties  reflecting 
essentially  the same point  of view. 
The  Centre rarty was the Catholic party.     In Germany the 
Catholic party has always  been moderate but not  reactionary 
because  it  represents not only  the  South German peasant  and 
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middle  class  but also the  Catholic trade  unions and the Catholic 
working  class.     Since the Kulturkampf  the  Centre has been the 
party of  opposition to  the   Imperial Reich. 
The  Democratic Party was also  a  centre party.     It represented 
the middle  class  liberal   elements  in Germany, and in many ways 
its policies   coincided with the Social  Democrats although the 
Democrats  never adv coated   a socialist program.     Of course the 
Social Democrats  never exerted  a great deal of  pressure on the 
government   to  pass their socialist program. 
The  parties of the centre v/ere  parties of  tradition and 
respsct  in Germany.     There was no  onus  attached  to  them  as there 
had been attached  to the  Socialist parties,   and   it was  largely 
for  this reason  that  the Majority Socialists wanted  a  coalition 
with them.     The alignment with the   centre gave the  Socialists 
a resirectibility  they had  not previously enjoyed;   socialist 
theory was not  so  garrish  to  German public  opinion when it was 
combined with  the mere moderate  policies of the  established 
centre. 
Immediately  to  the  right of the  centre parties was  the 
German People's Party.     The People's Party  represented the 
views of  the  industrial  and   the financial elements.    The 
policies  of the People's Party were conservative and were 
inclined   to  be nationalistic.    Under Gustav Stresemann the 
People's Party  aligned  itself with  the  ..'eimar Coalition 
(the centre  parties and  the  right wing Socialists]   to  form 
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the Great  Coalition.     Such a coalition reveals the strength of 
nationalist sentiment within  the  Socialist ranks. 
In practice  the people's Party acted  as an intermediary 
between the moderate  centre and  the  reactionary Right.    Until 
the advent of the National Socialists and  the   3avarian People's 
iarty  the  German Nationalist Party was the most reactionary 
party  in the Reichstag.     The  term "nationalist"  has a pecular 
connotation in German politics.     In denotes an in-group feeling, 
a feeling of being the exclusive  German party.     The Nationalists 
considered  themselves the  bearers of   the true   German sentiment, 
tx.e real  German party.     They were  extremely nationalistic,  and 
daring the republican period they were   extremely annexationist. 
The party  represented the  old   conservatives,   that   is,   the 
Junkers and  the army  and  the  remaining monarchists in Germnay. 
The  difficulties posed   by the parties represented  in the 
Reichstag of  the  Weimar Republic were  created   chiefly  by the 
fact  that all of   the parties had a  traditional policy which 
they continued to  follow:,  a  policy which they  carried  over 
from the  Imperial Reichstag.     Had   the  partled   been inaugurated 
at  the   time  of  the establishment  of  the  Republic,  the Socialists 
might not have had to face the  suspicions of  the  basically 
conservative  German people,  and  the parties of  the  Right  (the 
Nationalists and  the various separatist parties)  might  not 
have enjoyed   the  respect they did. 
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